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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
To best understand this case and the issues that are presented before this Honorable Court 
the prior procedural history of the case in chronological order with relevant court rulings and 
orders are provided. 
February 4, 2011. The Honorable Earl Blower enters his Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law after a three-day trial. At trial Appellant averred that it was in the best 
interest of the children that she be allowed to relocate with them to Salt Lake City, Utah. At the 
time of trial it was her intentions to marry her then fiance who also lived in that area. The 
children were born and raised in Idaho Falls, ID. The Court in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law found that it was in the children's best interest for them to remain in the 
Idaho Falls area and awarded primary physical custody of the children to the Respondent subject 
to a visitation order that would be forthcoming. The Honorable Earl Blower said, "Upon 
weighing all of the factors, the court concludes that the parties should share joint legal and 
physical custody of the children and that they should reside primarily with Hugo and have 
reasonable visitation with Dalrie unless Dalrie abandons her plan to move the children away, in 
which event the court would order the children to reside primarily with Dalrie and have 
reasonable visitation with Hugo." R Vol. I, p. 99, L. 7-12. 
February 11, 2011. Appellant filed with the court a document entitled "Statement of 
Unequivocal Desire." In that document the Appellant unequivocally states," ... Plaintiff hereby 





















5-6. The word "not" in the preceding quote is highlighted and bolded as it appeared in 
Appellant's original pleading. 
February 18, 2011. Despite unequivocally filing a "Statement of Unequivocal Desire" 
that the Appellant would not be moving from the Idaho Falls area she, one week later, filed a 
"Motion to Reconsider" and a "Second Motion to Reconsider" asking the court to, in fact, move 
to Salt Lake City, Utah. The entry of the Appellant's pleadings oddly do not appear in the record 
on appeal but the same appears in the District Court's Register of Actions and are Referenced by 
the Court in its "Memorandum Decision Including Amendments to Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law" in the record before this Court. R Vol. I, p. 116, L. 3-4. 
April 29, 2011. Judge Blower signed a "Supplemental Order' wherein he says, "Because 
Dalrie filed her Statement of Unequivocal Desire on February 11, 2011 advising the court that 
she will continue to reside in the Idaho Falls area - the children shall reside with Dalrie .... " R 
Vol. I, p. 125, L. 4-7. 
August 11, 2011. The Appellant files a "Verified Petition to Modify Prior Court Orders." 
Appellant cites that there is a material change in circumstances and that she has now married her 
fiance and desires to move with the children to Salt Lake City, Utah. It is important to note that 
this comes less than four months after the court's supplemental order and six months after she 
had filed her "Statement of Unequivocal Desire." The court denied the petition which the 
Appellant appealed to the District Court and The Honorable Judge Dane H. Watkins, Jr. affirmed 
the lower Court decision that there was not a material change in circumstances in that it was 





















Honorable Court that if Appellant believed she had full custody of the children then why would 
she need to modify the prior court orders in the first place? She could have moved to Salt Lake 
City without hindrance1 until Respondent filed a petition to modify based upon her not 
complying with her own Statement of Unequivocal Desire. R Vol. I, p. 133. 
November 25, 2011. The Honorable Steven A. Gardner enters an order denying 
Appellant's Verified Petition to Modify Prior Court Orders. The court became cognizant of 
Appellant's strategy involving her ability to move back to Salt Lake City with the children. "It 
appears that Dalrie has filed this petition because she regretted signing the "Statement of 
Unequivocal Desire" or thought to work around it after a very short period oftime by changing 
her circumstances." R Vol. I, p. 140, L. 6-12. 
Appellant was fully on notice of the court's orders as they are re-iterated in this 
November 24, 2011 Order. The court said, "This court is not, in any way, suggesting that the 
marriage by Dalrie to Mr. Cook is without merit as between the two of them, but it was entered 
into by Dalrie with full knowledge of the prior orders herein and how her custody would or could 
be effected." R Vol I, p. 140, L. 13-15. 
March 25, 2013. Appellant filed her Second Petition to Modify Prior Court Orders. 
Plaintiffs second Petition mirrored the first and did not provide any substantial change in 
circumstances other than the fact that the Plaintiff wanted the children in Salt Lake City. 
1 Appellant in fact moved to Salt Lake City pending her Verified Petition to Modify, the court 






















June 6, 2013. Respondent filed his Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Petition to Modify Prior 
Court Orders. 
August 30, 2013. The court dismissed the second Verified Petition to Modify. 
Importantly, the court said, "By her own conduct, it is clear that Dalrie never really intended to 
remain in Idaho Falls and that statements to that effect were not true. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the fact that since the time of the original orders herein Dalrie has twice 
petitioned to be relieved of her obligation to stay in Idaho Falls despite the fact that there are no 
changes of circumstances not previously litigated by the parties and contemplated by the court. 
Dalrie is desperately seeking to substitute her current husband into the lives of children in 
place of Hugo. Nevertheless, Hugo is the father of the children and such attempted substitution 
is not only inappropriate but troubling." R Vol. II, p. 267, L. 1-8. 
September 5, 2013. Respondent filed his Motion for Expedite Hearing as to Custody. 
October 3, 2013. The Court issued its Order Granting Motion for Expedited Hearing as 
to Custody. Much of this order will be discussed further within this document. The court found, 
among other things, that the court's supplemental order was dependent upon the Appellant 
repudiating her intention to move to Salt Lake City with the children, which she in fact never 
did. Consequently, the Court was enforcing its prior court orders and awarding custody back to 
the Respondent. 
Despite the Appellant's blatant intent to not follow her own pleadings with the court or 
its order, she saw it as an opportunity to skirt the orders of the court. She presents that the issues 





















1. Whether Judge Gardner committed error by granting a change of custody to the 
Respondent when there was not a petition to modify pending. 
2. If Judge Gardner did not commit error whether he erred by not defining Appellant's 
visitation with the children. 
3. Whether Judge Gardner erred by awarding Respondent Attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code (LC.)§ 12-120. 
4. Whether Appellant is entitled to attorney fees and costs on this appeal. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 






















The law in Idaho is clear that orders affecting the custody and support of children are 
subject to the continuing control of the court and do not become final. Jones v. State, 85 Idaho 
135,376 P.2d 261 (1962); Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho 349, 180 P.2d 853 (1947). The awarding of 
the custody of minor children, and the modification of decrees which award custody of minor 
children to one or both divorced parents involves judicial discretion which is to be exercised by 
the trial court, in the absence of an abuse of discretion it will not be disturbed on appeal. 
Thurman v. Thurman, 73 Idaho 122,245 P.2d 810 (1952); Smith v. Smith, supra; Idaho Code§ 
32-705. 
Child custody are questions for the trial court and it has been held, repeatedly, that the 
appellate court will not attempt to substitute its judgment and discretion for that of the trial court 
except in cases where the record reflects a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court. McGriff v. 
McGriff, 140 Idaho 642, 99 P.3d 111 (2004), Strain v. Strain, 95 Idaho 904, 523 P.2d 36 (1974). 
Idaho gives its requirements to show an abuse of discretion. A custody award will not be an 
abuse of discretion so long as the trial court: (1) recognized the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
acted within the outer limits of its discretion and consistently with the legal standard applicable 
to the available choices; and (3) reached its decision through an exercise if reason. Dani v. Dani, 
146 Idaho 929, 204 P.3d 1140 (2009). 
In the present case Judge Blower awarded custody of the children to the Respondent. 
Based upon his observations at trial as well as the observation of the experts he was concerned 





















that by allowing the Appellant to move to Utah he would be effectively segregating father from 
the lives of the children. Consequently, in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from the 
custody trail Judge Blower said, "The Court has attached significant weight to Dalrie' s plan to 
move away and the consequences that would accompany such a move. The court has given 
careful consideration to the opinions of court-appointed expert .... they shall reside primarily 
with Hugo unless Dalrie abandons her plans to move the children away .... " R Vol. I, p. 99, L. 
5-14. Appellant, of course, filed her unequivocal statement of desire to remain in Idaho Falls in 
order to retain custody of the children. 
From the record it is apparent that Appellant never intended to give up her plans to move 
to Utah. In fact, she filed two motions for reconsideration of Judge Blower's decision within one 
week of her filing her unequivocal statement to remain in Idaho Falls. Within four months the 
Appellant had filed her first Verified Petition for Modification of Prior Court Orders. Websters 
online dictionary defines "unequivocal" as, "admitting of no doubt or misunderstanding having 
only one meaning or interpretation and leading only to one conclusion." See www.websters-
cii~ji911my ,org{defi11itio11/llIJ~qgiyQ9.:1J. 
Appellant had married and moved to Utah within the four months that it took for Judge 
Blower to make its decision regarding custody. In any wedding there is planning, etc. Futher it 
was evident in the trial that Appellant had planned to move in with her fiance in Utah. At the 
time of the filing of her unequivocal statement the evidence that she herself presents before the 





















legal strategy to skirt the court's order not allowing her to move to Utah with the children. When 
that was denied, she tried again based upon the same grounds. 
The issue for any sitting court then becomes at what point does it enforce its prior orders. 
The court clearly found it in the children's best interests that Respondent should retain physical 
custody of the children should Appellant move to Utah and since actions speak louder than 
words the Appellant put the trial court in a precarious spot. Should the court continue to allow 
the Appellant to repudiate her unequivocal intention or should the Court enforce its orders over a 
rogue party. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure (IRCP) 60(b )( 6) allows the court to address the 
predicament in which the Appellant placed the court. It says, "On motion and upon such terms 
as are just, the court may relieve a party of his legal representative from judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons ... (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment." 
The court used IRCP 60(b )( 6) to recognize that Appellant had filed a falsehood with the 
court and or establish custody as the court had original intended, after three days of trial with 
witness and expert testimony. In Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho 724,274 P.3d 589 (2011), this 
Court said with respect to a court's decision under IRCP 60(b)(6), "A trial court's decision 
whether to grant relief pursuant to IRCP 60(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The decision 
will be upheld if it appears that the trial court ( 1) correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, 
(2) acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the applicable legal 





















Rule 60(b) turns largely on questions of fact to be determined by the trial court. Those factual 
findings will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. If the trial court applies the facts in a 
logical manner to the criteria set forth in Rule 60(b ), while keeping in mind the policy favoring 
relief in doubtful cases, the court will be deemed to have acted within its discretion." 
Judge Gardner was mindful of Maynard and cited it in his Order Granting Motion for 
Expedited Hearing As to Custody. He said, "The court recognizes that whether or not to grant 
relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is a matter within the court's discretion." R Vol. II, p. 323, L. 10-20. 
Judge Gardner goes on by delineating the court's position. "The Supplemental Order was in the 
alternative and based upon a deliberate misrepresentation to the court by Dalrie, the court 
ordered that she should have physical custody of the minor children. The court in its discretion 
finds that without the deliberate misrepresentation, Hugo would have been granted primary 
physical custody of the children. The court therefore, based upon the misrepresentation by 
Dalrie, should order that the primary physical custody of the children should be granted to 
Hugo." R Vol. II, p. 323, L. 18-23. Rule 60(b)(6) affords the court an opportunity to correct a 
misrepresentation to the court and do justice and equity. 
Appellant has not cited any case law or statute which would preclude the court from 
using its equitable powers in this fashion. Idaho has long held that court's have inherent 
equitable powers in order to correct a manifest injustice. Despite the Appellant arguing that the 
Respondent should have brought a motion under Rule 60(b )( 6) or should have filed for a 
modification of custody these are not required under the current state of law. In Campbell v. 





















law in Idaho which is a district court can sua sponte set aside that judgment under the Rule 60(b) 
powers. Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328,333,612 P.2d 1175 (1980); Eliopulos v. Idaho 
State Bank, 129 Idaho 104, 108-109, 922 P.2d 401 (Ct.App. 1996). 
In the present case before this Court although Respondent filed a motion which 
predicated Judge Gardner's invoking Rule 60(b)(6) he certainly was not required to wait for it. 
Idaho courts do not put form over function. For the Appellant to argue that the court must wait 
before it addresses its fraud takes power and equity from the hands of the court and places it 
squarely in those of the malfeasant. 
To argue that Respondent would have to file a petition to modify custody in order to have 
custody of the children begs the question: then why did appellant file two verified petitions for 
custody, one in late 2011 and another in early 2013, if she truly believed that she had complete 
physical custody of the children and that she would have until the Respondent filed a motion 
with the court. Wouldn't she have just moved with the children and then waited for the 
Respondent to file his petition? 
Appellant argues that even if Judge Gardner's order should stand he, at least, did not 
adequately order visitation. True or not Judge Gardner order reinforces the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law specifically entered by Judge Blower. Judge Blower ordered that should 
Appellant not file a statement of desire to not relocate then custody rests with Respondent. In 
that event, the Court ordered that it would be up to the parties to either agree on visitation or 





















Judge Gardner provided a rubric for visitation in its order. This does not preclude the 
parties from coming back before the court and re-establishing a different visitation schedule. 
The Appellant is free and has adequate counsel to prefect such a maneuver. 
Regarding the issue of attorney fees and costs that were granted to the Respondent by 
Judge Gardner pursuant to Idaho Code 12-120. While in some civil litigation cases fees may be 
obtained pursuant to 12-120, in this case the proper code section would have been Idaho Code 
12-121. Consequently, it is conceded that this issue should be remanded to the lower court for 
further consideration and an awarding of fees under the proper code section. 
Respondent should be awarded his fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 41 and 35. The basis for the claim is that the majority of the appeal deals 
specifically with the issue of whether Judge Gardner had authority to grant relief in the form that 
he did. Judge Gardner did indeed have that authority, and his actions were based upon the 
Appellant committing a misrepresentation to the court. For this reason attorney fees and costs 
for the appeal should be awarded to the Respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Gardner acted within his authority to correct an injustice perpetrated by the 
Appellant upon the Respondent. In so doing he rightfully awarded custody of the children to the 
Respondent, something that Judge Blower had originally ordered but for the fraud perpetrated by 
the Appellant. Respondent should prevail as to this issue and be awarded costs and attorney fees 
associated therewith. The issue of which code section for attorney fees that Judge Gardner 
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